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the blog and podcast of Glenn Peoples on philosophy, theology, politics, social issues


Dr Glenn Peoples on Abortion, Morality and Law

Canterbury student group Prolife UC have organised for Dr Glenn Peoples to deliver some free public lectures at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch on Abortion, Morality and Law.

Thursday 30th July 7.30 pm
“Chasing the Justificatory Goalpost: Public Justification and Religious Beliefs”

There is a broad political tradition that we are a part of that we could call “the liberal democracy.” Some modern thinkers allege that in a liberal democratic society like ours, we should not advocate policies or ideas in the public square that are justified by our religious beliefs (e.g. policies on abortion, marriage, education etc). This is because these people advocate a principle of justification, whereby all policies must be justifiable to our fellow citizen in a certain way, and (as everyone knows, of course!) all policies that are justified by our religious beliefs cannot be justified to our fellow citizens in this way. Dr Peoples will look at exactly what this principle of justification is, whether it is any good (he will argue that it needs improvement), and most importantly, will ask whether or not it is really true that policies that have a religious basis really do fail to be justified in this way.

Friday 31st July 7.30pm
“Abortion, Morality and Law”
Is abortion immoral, and should it be legal? The abortion controversy is a persistent one in New Zealand that has seen revived interest lately. Dr Glenn Peoples will provide reasons for deeming abortion immoral and for its legal restriction. He will also consider some arguments for abortion rights and explain how to address these, demonstrating that they overlook the fundamental moral issues involved.

Where: A3 lecture theatre, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (map and more info here)

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In a recent discussion with one of the commenters over at M and M’s blog (see the interchange between myself and someone using the nickname “Heraclides”) it occurred to me yet again that there are people – especially on the internet – who frequently wander into arguments about what are essentially subjects in philosophy, who clearly don’t have a background in philosophy, who appear not to have done much (or any) reading in the area they are arguing about, who are at times not really familiar with some of the basic terminology involved (even though they are using it), and there’s nothing terrible about any of this so far – but then your realise that they are talking as though they are absolutely certain that they are experts in the field. You offer a little advice, but you are told by this obvious newcomer that you couldn’t possibly know what you’re talking about.

Take my recent encounter. I said that scientists treat theories as provisional, but they do not treat knowledge as provisional. Knowledge is, after all, warranted true belief, so a scientist only knows something if he has become convinced that it is true. The reply that I was promptly given was “Theories *are* knowledge ;-) This suggests to me that you don’t understand what a theory really is.” Oh, and as for the fact that knowledge is warranted true belief, this is what my zealous fellow blog visitor had to say:  “Only a religious person would write “knowledge is warranted true belief”. This both shows that you don’t understand science (and thereby aren’t in a position to criticise it) and that you don’t understand the failing of insisting something is “true belief” either (it’s blind to any revision or new information).”

Rather than simply get further frustrated at the bleak intellectual scene that one often finds in the comments section at blogs out there (as illustrated by the above encounter), I have decided to put a little more energy into becoming part of the solution. I’m adding a new category to my blog. The category is called “nuts and bolts.” In this new category, I’ll add posts that spell out basic terms and concepts used in the various subject areas in philosophy. You might think this is a bit redundant. After all, there are plenty of online dictionaries and encyclopedias out there. And you’re right, there are. But the way I see it, the more good basic information is out there, the more likely somebody will be to stumble upon it. So here it is, the very first post in the nuts and bolts category.


Read the rest of the entry »

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Ian Harris tells us (“Honest to God,” Dominion Post, [Dominion Post. Saturday July 11, 2009. Page B5], reproduced at the YesVote website) that we should reject the “harsh views” on child rearing found in the Bible.

Mr Harris, unfortunately, joins many of those who promote the criminalisation of good parents by muddying the waters. He notes, for example, that someone who defends the right to use physical discipline also believes that children (like adults) are sinners. He then announces that since “progressive” Christians (by which he seems to mean those who no longer accept Christian theology) realise that this is based on an antiquated view, we should likewise reject the right to use physical discipline and we should criminalise those who do.

It is difficult to interact charitably with those who support the ban on smacking if this is the contorted way they are going to reason about the subject. Whether or not one thinks the theology held by some supporters of the right to use physical discipline is correct is quite a different matter from whether or not one thinks they ought to be made into criminals, surely!

Unfortunately again, Mr Harris attempts to use his platform as a mouthpiece of liberal (what he calls “progressive) Christianity to give credence to scientific claims that are obviously subject to great dispute. He makes the sweeping claim that this nebulous thing called “modern research” (while he cites no actual studies) shows that although corporal punishment does help bring about short-term compliance, it does not help a child to “internalise positive values for the longer term.”

I am constantly bemused by the way in which conservative religious spokespeople are ridiculed even when they do cite research, but obvious nonsense like this can be peddled by the liberal voices without so much as a single scholarly citation, and nobody is expected to bat an eyelid.

But even if what Mr Harris says is correct, the implication is that corporal punishment in and of itself has short term benefits and no long term ill effects. Hardly something to be prosecuting people for! The reality is that the effects he cites are perfectly compatible with the good of corporal punishment. Such punishment usually is administered to children when they are not willing to reason or reflect on the long term consequences of their actions. It is for when children are being unruly and unwilling to listen. Circumstances in which they are willing to do so are the circumstances under which corporal punishment is less necessary (meaning that the older a child becomes, the less frequent a smack will become). None of this gives the careful reader any reason to think that the occasional smack is immoral, much less worthy of criminal prosecution.

Bereft of compelling moral or scientifically grounded arguments, Mr Harris turns instead to arousing prejudice against the religious convictions of those who disagree with him about child discipline. Unable to find anything strong enough in what all Christians consider their holy book, he reaches into the book of Ecclesiasticus (part of the so-called “apocryphal” writings that did not make up part of the Hebrew canon) to find the claim that “he who loves his son will whip him often.”

But not only has Mr Harris strayed into literature that the so-called “fundamentalists” (most of whom would identify as conservative Protestants) that he attacks do not even regard to be part of the Bible at all, he has clearly sought out the most extreme translation of the verse that he can find. He conjures up grizzly pictures of leering parents towering, horsewhip in hand, over the broken and bleeding bodies of little children with misleading language like this.

But just a few minutes research would dispel this attempt. The New American translation reads, “He who loves his son chastises him often.” The Douay Rheims translation (the Catholic Bible, which does include this book as part of the canon) reads “He that loveth his son, frequently chastiseth him.” The old King James version, the one that “fundamentalists” are most likely to read if the read this book at all, reads “He that loveth his son causeth him oft to feel the rod.” Of course, because it’s a metaphor for physical discipline that’s probably still too much for Mr Harris, but needless to say, it robs him of his “whipping” bogeyman.

After the rhetorical debris is stripped away, all that’s really left is a string of namecalling and fearful language. He calls the views of his opponents “repugnant.” He calls them “fundamentalists” with “antiquated” views that are opposed to “progressive” thought. But where’s the actual substance? Like much of the rhetorical fireworks that is being leveled at those who want the law changed to a common sense view that refuses to place thousands of good parents in the criminal category, Ian Harris offers more heat than light, and manifests just the sort of shallowness and bias that this debate could do without.

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In the continued pursuit of its secular socialist state and its rejection of religion, North Korea, according to human rights groups, has stepped up its execution of Christians.

The communist country, the world’s most closed society, views religion as a major threat.
Only the founder of the country, Kim Il-sung, and his son, Kim Jong-il, may be worshipped, in mass public displays of fervour.
Despite the persecutions, it is thought up to 30,000 North Koreans may practise Christianity secretly in their homes.

They are correct – Christianity is a threat to their society. In spite of the ludicrous caricatures present by other proponents of the secular (in the sense of “godless” or “opposed to religious beliefs”) state, North Korea’s leaders have recognized, like Stalin and Pol Pot, that Christian faith and the values that it promotes threatens to undermine the dictatorship they embrace.

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2-year-old Dunedin boy Caleb Turner is heading overseas for stem cell therapy. He has cerebral palsy.

Some defenders of the destruction of embryos for stem cell research and therapy use examples like this to bash opponents of the use of embryonic stem cells. Wrong. Yet again in a productive use of stem cells, no embryos were harmed – or needed. Once more, the therapy that offers this hope is an “umbilical cord stem cell transplant.” The cells came from blood from umbilical cords.

Roll on the progress, but don’t bring embryos into it.

Glenn Peoples

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The guilty verdict of convicted murderer Clayton Weatherson today came as good news. However, some people, including the father of the victim Sophie Elliot, are now saying that the defence should not have been allowed to use the defence of provocation. In fact, they are saying that there should exist no such defence in law.

Women’s Refuge chief executive Heather Henare joined Mr Elliott in calling for the provocation defence to be reviewed.

“Because of the way the defence was run, this trial became a perverse opportunity for a killer to continue to persecute his victim and her family after her death.

“The provocation defence is based on absolutely archaic notions about violence. Once upon a time, society accepted that an affront to male privilege or dignity was a reasonable excuse to fly into a homicidal rage.

“This trial turned justice inside out. The killer became the victim and Sophie Elliott was portrayed to us all as he chose to describe her. Unfortunately for Clayton Weatherston the jury didn’t buy it and nor did the hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders who watched him giggling on their televisions.”

Unfortunately, Ms Henare’s rather hasty comments display a lack of understanding of the law and a distinctly sexist view of legislation surrounding homicide.

The provocation defence does not suggest that an affront to “male privilege or dignity” is “a reasonable excuse” to kill. In fact even when the provocation defence is successful, the killer is not excused as Ms Henare claims. Provocation is and has only ever been a mitigating factor, never an excuse. What it says is that there is a difference between the premeditated murder of an innocent person, and the immediate reaction to a situation where one person provokes another so extremely that they cannot be expected to respond like the rational person. For example, a man has molested a woman’s daughter in the past, and he now horribly taunts her about it to her face, describing his revolting acts in detail. That would probably count as provocation.

Take note: To say that there should be no defence of provocation is to say that there is no moral difference between a woman like this who kills and a scumbag like Clayton Weatherston who committed premeditated murder against an innocent young woman. That, dear readers, is a truly disgusting claim and I defy anyone who makes it to defend it.

Of all people, Ms Henare should understand this. Women’s refuge and women’s groups are familiar with and sympathetic toward women who have been subject to prolonged abuse by their partners, only to finally snap and lash out in a calm moment. I’m not at all implying that I think this behaviour is justified, and I certainly do not believe that this is anything like what Clayton Weatherston did (after all, I don’t think he was provoked), but it sounds very much like Ms Henare is showing her bias here.

However it is surprising how pervasive this misunderstanding – or at least serious misuse of language – really is. President of the Law Commission Sir Geoffrey Palmer is himself guilty of doing it. In his call for the repeal of the provocation defence, he acknowledges that it is a partial defence (as Heather Henare does not), but even still he makes his appeal sound more rhetorically powerful by repeatedly saying things such as that the defence of provocation does not “offer a valid excuse for murder.” Once again, it is not and has never been intended as an excuse. Never.

Ever the enemy of due process, the Labour Party is also calling for the abolition of the provocation defence.

This kind of overreaction is common in New Zealand, but quite misguided. The line of thinking is that since Clayton Weatherston’s lawyer tried to use it, and since Clayton Weather was clearly not provoked, the defence of provocation should be repealed. What nonsense! What if his lawyer had been silly enough to claim that the killing was in self defence? Since it clearly was not self defence, would that prompt us to cry for the abolition of that defence? Clearly not. This is just like the ill thought out argument of those who reason that “since section 59 of the crimes act allows parents to use reasonable force when correcting children, and since some people beat their kids and then falsely claim that it was reasonable force, the section should be abolished!” It’s bad reasoning in that case, and it’s bad reasoning here as well.

Was Weatherston provoked? No, as the court easily found. Is anyone ever provoked? Undoubtedly. That Weatherston’s lawyer falsely put her client in the same category as those people is no excuse to rob those people of every defence to which they are entitled. What’s sad is that any disagreement with the many voices calling for the abolition of the provocation partial defence is likely to be seen as sympathy with Weatherston, in spite of the fact that I’ve said that he was not provoked at all. The fact is I think he should be executed. I’m not bothered by the herd mentality, because I’m more interested in what is right than in what is popular.

Glenn Peoples

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Today, as I expected, Clayton Weatherston was found guilty of murdering his then girlfriend, Sophie Elliot.

He took a knife to her place, locked the door after him, stabbed her 216 times (in full view of her horrified mother), then mutilated parts of her body. The defence argued that he was provoked into doing all of this. Predictably, the jury were not persuaded (thank God).

Prior to the verdict, I’ve heard a few people say things like “he must be sick in the head” or “he must be insane. No sane person could do that.” I’m relieved that the court did not think this way. This line of reasoning presupposes that human beings who are not unwell simply aren’t capable of being gratuitously evil. Guess what? We are.

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I’m doing some writing on the concept of numerical identity at present, so I thought it might be interesting to consult Google to see what others have said about it. I can usually rely on the contributors to the Standford Encyclopedia of philosophy, but this time somebody (Harold Noonan), I daresay, got it wrong. He writes:

To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same. “Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their meanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

This is mostly correct. Yes, there is a fundamental distinction between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Two things can have all the same qualities (e.g. two rubber balls made on the same production line) and so be qualitatively identical, but because there are two balls sitting side by side and not one ball, they are not numerically identical. When you’re counting how many balls there are, you have to count two, or you’ve missed at least one.

But Noonan goes very wrong when he says that “Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity.” It actually requires no such thing. Consider for example the following scenario, especially the question: “Martha says this is my long lost husband. He looks so different. Could he really be the same man I knew ten years ago?” The question clearly makes sense, and it is clearly a question about identity. But it is not a question about qualitative identity. The questioner already knows that the man she now sees and the man she was married to ten years ago are not qualitatively identical. The man she sees before her looks different, so he has different qualities. The question is whether or not this man is numerically identical with the man she once knew. And this question is one that could quite conceivably be answered in the affirmative. This is because – as is perfectly obvious once we see what the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is – there is nothing at all about numerical identity over time that requires qualitative identity.

It’s possible that Noonan would grant the error if it were pointed out to him, and qualify his statement somewhat to say something like: “At any fixed point in time, not allowing for qualitative change, a thing’s being numerically identical with something requires that it have qualitative identity with it as well.” But as it stands, it’s a bit of a howler.

The reason I was doing the search in the first place was because I’m preparing a piece on the abortion issue where I explain that even though I am not qualitatively identical with a fetus (I’m obviously a lot bigger, I have much more brain function etc), I am quite obviously numerically identical with a fetus from the past (from 1975 actually). Imagine my shock to see a philosopher contributing to a fairly prestigious encyclopedia making a mistake like this. Maybe he was having one of those days.

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Taking a very short break from the series In Search of the Soul, here’s a talk I gave at Church a few nights ago. It was on Psalm 69 and the subject of lament. Nothing too deep, just something to chew over. Enjoy.

Glenn Peoples

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A small part of Twentieth Century New Zealand history is usually glossed over, but not any more: The Labour Government of the day wanted to appease Hitler and sit around the table to talk peace even after he broke the former agreement with Britain and invaded Poland:

Though it has been commonly assumed that New Zealand vocally opposed the Nazi expansion and urged Britain to confront Hitler’s regime, two historians are arguing this is not true.

New Zealand continued to push for negotiations with Hitler even as Britain declared war, while still honouring a trade agreement made with Germany in 1937, they say.

Massey University head of history, philosophy and classics James Watson said he and New Zealand Defence Force historian John Crawford began their research after discovering discrepancies in the history books.

Read more HERE. Let’s see, waiting until dangerous states break agreements that were the condition for peace, and then condemning those who want to act swiftly. That’s our Labour alright. Some things never change.

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